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THE PROFESSORS WHO CONTROL THE OIL
PATCH: A CASE STUDY ON THE VIRILITY OF
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

by

Chase J. Edwards*
Justin C. Ward**

Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals recently made headlinesi in legal news publications
because of commentsii he made regarding the role of the legal
academy in the nation’s court system. In typical Posner style,
he pulled no punches: “I don’t doubt that law professors are
frequently active outside the classroom and that their academic
work sometimes addresses practical issues, but what I’d like to
see is evidence of impact. Amicus briefs? Working for
nonprofits? Blogging? ‘Speaking truth to power?’ Absurd:
speak all you want, professors, power doesn’t listen to the likes
of you.”iii

*

Chase J. Edwards is an Assistant Professor of Law & Galloway Endowed
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Nevertheless, Louisiana courts have recently used treatises
from ancient scholars Jean Domat (1625-1696) and Marcel
Planiol (1853-1931) alongside commentary from contemporary
civil law scholars such as A. N. Yiannopoulos and Alain
Levasseur to decide the cases of Eagle Pipe & Supply, Inc v.
Amerada Hess Corp in 2011 and its progeny Regions Bank v.
Questar Exploration & Production Corp4 in 2016, likely the
most important cases in recent history for the oil and gas
industry of Louisiana.
Despite a century of jurisprudential and scholarly analysis
of the rights and obligations that exist between landowners and
oil producers, no case law addressed the possibility that the
language of certain mineral “leases” could actually transfer
partial ownership of the land. The arguments for and against
the proposition were each cogent, valid, and feasible. “Oil and
gas production in Louisiana commenced on a significant scale
just over a century ago. Most mineral leases expire as
production ends before they reach the 99-year mark. [These]
leases may be the first time that this issue has arisen.” 5 The
court was forced to go back to the basics, and lean on the
treatises that all Louisiana lawyers cut their teeth on and the
principles of textual interpretation that they established.
Often considered the platypus of jurisprudence, Louisiana
operates a “bijural” legal system that has evolved to
incorporate many characteristics of the common law while
maintaining its civil law roots. However, the lessons of these
cases apply equally to all states that recognize “secondary
sources” of law.
Section One of this paper recounts the first major battle over
mineral rights in Louisiana which sought to dispose of leases
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by asserting that reconduction of a lease based on continued
production violated the requirement for leases to have a term.
Section Two delves into the intervening years of scholarship
that addressed the general requirements and prohibitions of the
Louisiana Mineral Code. It explores their basis in public
policy, and the subtle differences between mineral leases and
mineral servitudes in light of the ancient dismemberments of
ownership that are inherent in most civil law systems. More
importantly, it exemplifies the role of the professorate in
developing official Comments to the various codes which are
used by judges to interpret the meaning of the law as it is
written by the legislature.
Section Three analyzes the doctrine of real and personal
rights as expressed in several leading treatises from active and
emeritus professors which build on the works of ancient
commenters and scholars. These scholarly contributions form
the basis of the rulings in both Eagle Pipe v. Amerada Hess
and Regions v. Questar, which represent the first
jurisprudential acknowledgments of the doctrinal tenants that
have governed Louisiana’s billions of barrels of oil and
trillions of cubic feet of natural gas for more than a century,
and which set critical precedent for the next wave of mineral
lease litigation that will attempt to invalidate leases based on
the seemingly impenetrable prohibition against leases over 99
years.
The conclusion of this paper recounts the contributions of
treatise writers, professors, and practicing academics who help
shape the legal landscape, and presents opportunities for
professors to prove Judge Posner wrong by affecting change in
the law through their work.
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LEASES HAVE LIMITS
The first successful oil well in Louisiana was drilled in
September of 1901 outside the town of Jennings. This
discovery occurred just months after the famous “Spindletop”
gushers were drilled less than 100 miles away in Beaumont,
Texas. The oil boom that followed has produced more than 25
billion barrels of oil and 200 trillion cubic feet of natural gas
from more than 1 million wells. The impact of the mineral
industry on Louisiana’s economy cannot be overstated. Thus,
there is no shortage of litigation regarding ownership of the
minerals themselves.
The first wave of litigation came ten years into the boom.
Landowners who signed the first mineral leases sought to be
released from their agreements in order to re-sign under the
more favorable terms that became common as the industry
became less speculative. To do this, landowners attacked the
various terms6 included in the leases.
IDENTIFYING PERPETUAL LEASES
Louisiana law has always required that a lease have a term.
It may not be perpetual or perpetually extendable.7 This
principal, now embodied in Civil Code Article 2678, is derived
from Article 2674 of the Civil Code of 1870 – which required a
lease be for a “certain time” – and from a long line of
Louisiana case law which held that a perpetual “lease” is
nadum pactum. This line of jurisprudence8 maintained that any
stipulation which allowed a grantee to hold a grantors property
under a perpetual lease or option would “take the property out
of commerce and be violative of the doctrine of ownership.”9
This principle was ultimately codified in both the Louisiana
Civil Code and the Mineral Code.10 This ended the need for
jurisprudential analysis of this requirement, but a study of its
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reasoning is essential back story for the modern day fight over
long-term leases wherein property owners seek to regain
control of ancestral land that has been mined for close to a
century.
Bristo v. Christine Oil & Gas Company is one of the earliest
Louisiana decisions addressing a “perpetual lease.”11 At issue
in Bristo was a contract purporting to be a sale of the minerals
on or in the plaintiff’s property and a lease of the land for
mining purposes.12 The contract stipulated that, if a well could
not be commenced within a year from the date of the contract
and “prosecuted with due diligence, the grant was to become
null and void, provided that the grantee might prevent the
forfeiture from year to year by paying to the grantor the sum of
10 cents per acre annually until a well was commenced or until
shipments from the mines had begun.”13 In considering the
validity of the contract, the Court held:
It may be assumed that the grantee could have
acquired a mineral lease for 25 years by drilling
a well on the plaintiff's land within the year
stipulated in the contract. It is not disputed that
the grantee's rights, if he had any, under the
contract, were forfeited by his failure to
commence drilling a well on the plaintiff's land
within the year, unless it be held that the
defendant could prevent the forfeiture and keep
the option in force indefinitely by paying the
stipulated annual rental of 10 cents an
acre…Our opinion is that that stipulation in the
contract is null for want of a fixed or definite
term. Whether it be regarded as a lease or an
option, it would be an anomalous contract
without a definite term or limitation. To
recognize that the defendant has the right,
without any obligation, to hold the plaintiffs
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land under a perpetual lease or option, would
take the property out of commerce, and would
be violative of the doctrine of ownership
defined in the second title of the second book of
the Civil Code.14
The holding of Bristo was recited a number of times in
cases immediately following its rendition.15 Hence, judges
have adopted the following definitions as indicative of the
nature of a perpetual lease. As to a mineral lease, “[t]he lease
in perpetuity reprobated by the law is the mere holding by the
lessee, indefinitely, of an option to exploit the property,
without production of any kind, since the lessee must either
develop with reasonable diligence or give up the lease.”16 As
to a surface lease, a perpetual lease should be considered as an
instrument that would allow the lessee the option of retaining
his interest in the property indefinitely without the lessor
having the right to terminate the contract by operation of a
term.17
HABENDUM CLAUSES BECOME STANDARD ACROSS THE OIL & GAS
INDUSTRY
The purpose of the habendum clause in an oil and gas lease
is to fix the ultimate duration of the interest granted to the
lessee.18 A habendum clause essentially predicates the term of
the lease based upon the occurrence of a resolutory condition19
– i.e. the cessation of production in paying quantities. While
the Louisiana Mineral Code has long prohibited leases in
perpetuity, leases which have stipulated to continue during the
existence of a certain condition have been held to be valid.20
This rule has been applied to both surface leases and mineral
leases.21
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Both Poole v. Winwell, Inc. and Cain v. GoldKing
Properties Company involved surface leases with terms tied to
the continued production of oil and gas on property not
included within the leased area.22 In Poole, the Louisiana Third
Circuit Court of Appeal, which covers the oil-rich southwest
portion of the state, turned to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s
decision in Busch-Everett Co. v. Vivian Oil Co.23 (wherein the
Court upheld a mineral lease under a habendum clause) and
concluded that “our Supreme Court has upheld a lease with a
production term similar to those in the instant case, holding
that it is not necessary that the term of a lease be expressed in
terms of time, for the lease may be stipulated to continue only
during the continuation of a given condition. Accordingly, the
term provisions of the leases involved in the instant suit are not
at variance with codal requirements.” Cain was decided soon
thereafter in another oil-producing area of the state.24
The same concept has long applied specifically to mineral
leases. In Busch-Everett, the Supreme Court considered the
validity of a mineral lease which provided that, should the
lessee succeed in “bringing in a second well in paying
quantities, then the contract was to continue in full force for
two years, and as much longer as oil, gas, or other minerals
can be produced in paying quantities.”25 (emphasis added) In
upholding the lease agreement, the court stated:
Now as relates to a term:
It was really more of a condition than a term.
The contract was to continue in force as long as
the wells produced. That was a condition,
which, it may be, plaintiffs could have
terminated by obtaining a judicial order to that
effect. But a contract of lease (and in this
respect we consider the contract one of lease)
may be entirely legal without a term, or a term
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may be so indefinite that only the court can
determine its date.26
The Court expressed a similar opinion in Sam George Fur
Company v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipeline Company.27 At issue
therein was a mineral lease with the following provision:
If the Lessee shall sink a well or shaft and
discover oil, gas or sulphur in paying quantities
in or under the above described land, then this
lease shall remain in full force and effect for ten
years from such discovery and as much longer
as oil, gas or sulphur shall be produced
therefrom in paying quantities.
The Plaintiff challenged the validity of the lease and sought to
have the contract canceled on the grounds that the above
quoted language essentially established a perpetual lease, and
was thus null and void.28 The Court responded to this argument
by stating: “[s]uch a lease is by no means a lease in perpetuity,
as the main consideration of the lease is the development of the
land, and it is a matter of common knowledge that oil and gas
fields cease to produce in paying quantities after the lapse of a
certain number of years. The lease in perpetuity reprobated by
the law is the mere holding by the lessee, indefinitely, of an
option to exploit the property, without production of any
kind…”29
So, in the first great battle of remorseful landowners versus
oil producers, landowners clearly lost. Courts ruled so
consistently, during the first decades of oil litigation, that
mineral production extended the lifetime of a lease that the
Mineral Code was amended to say just that. And, for the rest
of the first century of oil production, that was the standard
mineral lease.
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BUT, SOMETIMES, A LEASE ISN’T A LEASE
The Louisiana Civil Code’s first article states that “[t]he
sources of law are legislation and custom.”30 Custom, in turn,
“results from practice repeated for a long time and generally
accepted as having acquired the force of law.”31 Custom is
most often developed and cited in the writings of professors
who document the year-to-year happenings of business and
legal dealings in their scholarly journal articles and treatises.
The concept of prescription32, which is analogous to a
“statute of limitations” in other states, is naturally well-litigated
due its dispositive nature in litigation. Provisions in the
various codes (Civil, Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, etc.)
govern the lifetime of a right’s existence and the actions that
can extend or exterminate that right. The Louisiana Mineral
Code supplements the state’s Civil Code and covers issues
regarding mineral law, including mineral leases.33
Article 115 of the Louisiana Mineral Code imposes certain
term limitations on the typical mineral lease. The provision
provides in relevant part:
The interest of a mineral lessee is not subject to
the prescription of nonuse, but the lease must
have a term. Except as provided in this Article,
a lease shall not be continued for a period of
more than ten years without drilling or mining
operations or production. Except as provided in
this Article, if a mineral lease permits
continuance for a period greater than ten years
without drilling or mining operations or
production, the period is reduced to ten years.34
PROFESSORS AS OFFICIAL COMMENTERS
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Each Code within Louisiana Law has Comments, the text of
which are not law, but are persuasive authority when judicial
interpretation of the law is needed. The Comments do not
come from the lawmakers who write the legislation. Instead,
they come from the Louisiana State Law Institute which is
comprised of law professors, jurists, and practicing
academics35 who meet regularly to provide commentary on
existing and pending legislation. In other words, the work of
professors is printed alongside the words of legislators. In the
recent cases discussed herein, the official Comments played an
important role.
The Comments to Article 115 explain that the article
generally preserves established law and custom by providing
that the interest of the lessee is not subject to prescription; that
a lease must contain a term; and that the standard habendum36
clause will generally satisfy the term requirement. However,
the Comments go further in explaining that the requirement
that a mineral lease not contain a primary term of more than 10
years is somehow related to the prescription of nonuse
applicable to mineral servitudes, which are real rights. The
Comments provide:
[T]here has always lurked in the background of
the law applicable to mineral leases the
possibility that the court might hold that
although a mineral lease is not subject to the
prescription of nonuse, it cannot be granted for a
primary term greater than ten years.
Customarily, primary terms do not exceed ten
years… Placing this limitation on the primary
term is consistent with the public policy
underlying the system of prescription applicable
to other mineral rights. The net effect of this
limitation in combination with the first sentence
[of Article 115] is to free the mineral lease of
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the use rules applicable to servitudes while
accomplishing the end of prohibiting all basic
forms of mineral rights from remaining
outstanding for periods greater than ten years
without some form of development…
Previously, it was not established that the
mineral lease either could or could not be
granted for a primary term greater than ten
years. The danger of providing expressly that
they could be granted for primary terms greater
than ten years lay in the possibility that there
might be widespread evasion of the public
policy embodied in the prescriptive rules
applicable to other forms of mineral rights. In
selling land, the vendor might reserve a paid-up
mineral lease with a primary term of thirty years
rather than a mineral servitude. Previously, the
threat that the court might impose the sort of
limitation provided for by Article 115 had a
deterrent effect on the widespread granting of
long term leases. The removal of that threat
might have resulted in subversion of the entire
system of prescription. It is therefore provided
that the ten-year limitation be imposed. This is
viewed as essential to preservation of the
mineral property system as a whole.
SCHOLARS DEVELOP THE MINERAL SERVITUDE DOCTRINE INTO A
REAL RIGHT FOR LEASEHOLDERS
The Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the Mineral
Servitude Doctrine in Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling’s
Heirs in 1922.37 This doctrine precludes the creation of a
mineral estate distinct from, and independent of, the full title to
the land, and is perhaps the most unusual feature of Louisiana
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mineral law when compared to the mineral regimes of other
states.38 A mineral servitude conveys the right of enjoyment of
land belonging to another for the purpose of exploring for and
producing minerals and reducing them to ownership.39 The
Supreme Court has described the conveyance of a servitude as
a “dismemberment of the title insofar as it creates a secondary
right in the property separate from the principal right of
ownership of the land…[and]…effectively fragments the title
such that different elements of ownership are owned by
different owners.” 40
The works of professor-written treatises are essential to
developing an understanding of this subtle, but critical,
distinction. “While the jargon of the industry often speaks in
reference to the ‘term’ of a mineral servitude or to a mineral
servitude having a ‘life’ of ten years, in actuality, a servitude is
a real right of unlimited duration, provided that it does not
extinguish in some manner recognized by law.”41 The Mineral
Code provides for various modes of extinction of a mineral
servitude; however, the most significant cause for extinction is
“prescription resulting from nonuse for ten years.”42
Prescription begins to accrue from the date on which the
servitude is created, and if the servitude is to be maintained
beyond ten years, some use of the right must be made.43
However, there is no limitation on the successive 10-year
periods which can be triggered by successive use.44
The scholarship clearly indicates that, other than the 10-year
prescription of non-use, there is no legally imposed temporal
limit on the existence of a mineral servitude yet no cases have
ever been cited for this proposition, only the work of
scholars.45
Leaseholders also found support in the Comments on
Mineral Code Article 74, again written by the scholars and
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professors of the Louisiana State Law Institute, which provide
that parties may either fix the term of a mineral servitude or
shorten the applicable period of prescription of nonuse or
both.46 If a period of prescription greater than ten years is
stipulated, the period is reduced to ten years.47 The Comments
to Article 74 explain:
In the event of silence as to the term of a
mineral servitude, the right created is
permanent or perpetual, but it is subject to loss
by accrual of prescription of nonuse.
It is established by Hodges v. Norton and
Bodcaw Lumber Company of Louisiana v.
Magnolia Petroleum Company, that if a term
greater than ten years is specified, this fixes the
duration of the interest created. It is however,
still subject to the prescription of nonuse and
will expire prior to the running of the specified
term if not used within the legal prescriptive
period.48
The principals espoused in Article 74 and the comments
thereto were, to an extent, addressed in Hodges v. Norton and
Bodcaw Lumber Company of Louisiana v. Magnolia Petroleum
Company. In Hodges v. Norton the Court dealt with a mineral
reservation “for a period of 15-years from and after” the date of
its granting.49 The Court noted that the servitude was “limited
in its duration to fifteen years and that, even though the course
of prescription was interrupted” the servitude would prescribe
at the expiration of the fifteen year term.50 In Bodcaw Lumber
Co. of Louisiana v. Magnolia Petroleum Company.51 The
Court considered a mineral servitude “for the term of fifteen
years.”52 The Court explained:
The time limit of fifteen years, within which
Bodcaw Lumber Company, or its successors or
assigns, might have extracted or removed the oil
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and gas from the land, was inserted in the
contract, not for the purpose of extending the
time within which the right might be enjoyed,
but for the purpose of limiting the time in which
it might be enjoyed.
Neither Hodges (1942) nor Bodcaw (1929) contain an
affirmation that a mineral servitude, without some contractual
limitation, is a perpetual interest subject to the incidents of
extinction set forth in the Mineral Code. In both cases, the
Louisiana Supreme Court was addressing conflict over leases
in an industry that was still in its infancy. However,
commenters and treatise writers adopted these cases as
exemplary of how the law should treat these agreements.
Seventy years after Hodges, when the courts had to decide
whether or not leases which extended beyond 99 years were
valid, it was the inclusion of these cases in scholarly writings
which gave them the force of law.
DESPITE BEING CALLED A “LEASE”, SCHOLARSHIP
DICTATES THAT A MINERAL LEASE IS A REAL
(PROPERTY) RIGHT
According to the rigorous civilian classification system, all
rights are either personal or real.53 Real rights are referenced
throughout the Code, and, while no legislative definition exists,
this type of interest is generally described as ownership and its
various forms of dismemberment based on the writings of
ancient and modern professors and scholars. In the most basic
terms, a real right is a right that a person has in a thing – i.e. a
matter of property law – while a personal right is a right that a
person has against another person to demand a performance –
i.e. a matter of the law of obligations.54 As explained by
Professor Yiannopoulos:

49 / Vol 36 / North East Journal of Legal Studies

[D]espite certain similarities, the two species of
rights appear to be of a different nature.
According to appearances, a usufructuary55 and
a lessee seem to have the use and enjoyment of
a house in much the same way.
But,
technically, the usufructuary has a right in the
enjoyment of a house; the lessee has a right
against the owner of a house to let him enjoy it.
One has a real right and the other a personal
right.56
The Mineral Code and its Comments now identify mineral
leases as a real right.57 And while this classification may have
been questioned by early Louisiana Supreme Court decisions,58
the classification of a mineral lease as a real right has become a
fixture in Louisiana law.59 In contrast, it is well settled in
Louisiana that under the “civil law concept, a lease does not
convey any real right or title to the property leased, but only a
personal right.”60 This is a material distinction between mineral
leases and surface leases.
The classification of an interest as a “real” or “personal”
right is fundamental in civil law systems.61 Real rights are
property rights that confer direct and immediate authority over
a “thing” to be enforced against the world.62 Without a “thing”
to which the real right may attach, a real right cannot exist. A
personal right does not attach to any particular “thing,” it is
merely the right of a particular obligee to enforce a particular
obligation against a particular obligor. All real rights,
including mineral leases, have certain common characteristics
that are not exhibited by personal rights absent some special
provision to the contrary. These characteristics may be
summarized as follows:
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1. Real rights always attach to a thing.
Personal rights however do not require a
specific thing to exist.63
2. Real rights may be enforced against the
world. Personal rights may only be enforced
by the obligee against the obligor who
legally or conventionally assumed the
obligation sought to be enforced.64
3. Real rights follow the thing to which they
are attached, thus anyone who takes
ownership of a thing encumbered by a real
right takes it subject to that right. Personal
rights remain with the obligor, they do not
follow the thing because they do not attach
to the thing.65
4. Real rights may be created unilaterally by
the holder.
Personal rights necessarily
require a certain obligee and a certain
obligor.66
5. Real rights can be abandoned unilaterally by
the holder. Personal rights because they
involve both a certain obligor and a certain
obligee, cannot be abandoned by the obligor
without the consent of an obligee.67
6. The obligations correlative to real rights can
be avoided by dispossession of the thing to
which they are attached. Personal rights are
not necessarily affected by the transfer of a
particular thing.68
The division of patrimonial rights into personal and real is
inherit in the structure of the Louisiana Civil Code.69 A
personal right is the legal power that a person, the obligee, has
to demand from another person, the obligor, a performance
consisting of giving, doing, or not doing.70 As explained by the
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Louisiana Supreme Court, a personal right “defines man’s
relationship to man and refers merely to an obligation one owes
to another which may be declared against the obligor.”71
Personal rights are governed by the law of obligations found in
Book III of the Louisiana Civil Code, entitled “Of the Different
Modes of Acquiring the Ownership of Things.72
Personal rights must be contrasted with real rights. A real
right should be understood as ownership and its various forms
of dismemberment.73 As explained by the Court, “a real right is
synonymous with proprietary interest, both of which refer to a
species of ownership. Ownership defines the relationship of
man to things and may, therefore, be declared against the
world.”74 The various dismemberments of ownership allowed
under Louisiana law each confer real rights on the owner or
holder of that interest.75
Planiol spoke at length on the primary distinction between
real rights and personal rights, which he refers to as “right of
credit.”76 He explained the importance of the characteristics
inherent in real rights by reference to the following examples:
There are considerable practical differences
between [real rights and rights of credit]. Two
examples will bring out the nature of the
differences.
(1)
INSOLVENCY OF A TRADER. All the
creditors of an insolvent trader are in the same
position. Each of them has his claim to assert
against the insolvent, but none of them has special
rights to advance against the others. They are all
therefore upon a plane of equality. No one of them
can prevail over the others. And if we assume, as is
the ordinary case, that they are all of them creditors
for sums of money, the loss resulting from the
insolvency of the common debtor must be divided
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among them. Each of them will receive merely a
dividend, so much per cent upon the sum due. This
result is expressed by saying that the creditors are
governed by the law applicable in competitive
proceedings, and they are paid, in case of
insolvency, pro rata.
But another person appears who has a real right.
An owner for example, claims as his property
merchandise deposited in the insolvent’s store; or a
second creditor asserts in addition to his claim, a
special real right called a pledge or mortgage.
These persons have a real right that can be set off
against all persons, including the insolvent’s
creditors. They will, therefore, be able to exclude
all these creditors, and keep for themselves either in
kind or in value the things that belong to them or
which had been pledged to or mortgaged to them.
The competitive rule therefore does not apply.
They have, as regards the others, a right of
preference.
(2)
THEFT OF A MOVABLE. When a thing has
been stolen, he who is its owner may lay claim to it,
that is to say, follow the thief or any other detainer
of the thing to reclaim his property. He who is
merely a creditor has solely an action in restitution
or in indemnification against the person who owed
it to him or who permitted it to be stolen. He has no
real action that can be set off against everybody.
He has a more personal action against the debtor,
who alone is responsible to him. The difference is
expressed by saying that the real right confers a
right of pursuit which a right of credit does not.
The owner follows, pursues the thing into whatever
hands it passes. A creditor cannot follow the thing.
He can attack nobody other than his debtor.
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Right of Pursuit and Right of Preference: these
are the great advantages of real rights over rights of
credit. These are not, as is often said, special
attributes, something extrinsic, attached to real
rights. They are the very essence of its realness,
that is to say the nature opposable to all persons.77
CONCLUSION AND PREDICTIONS FOR UPCOMING
LITIGATION
LAWSUITS 99 YEARS IN THE MAKING
Landowners will continually seek ways to end longstanding
mineral leases and servitudes. The latest and greatest hope to
wipe the slate clean and regain control of their oil, gas, and
minerals is the Louisiana Civil Code’s prohibition of leases
over 99 years. At stake are thousands of oil and gas leases
blanketing a state that has produced over 25,000,000,000
barrels of oil and 200,000,000,000,000 cubic feet of natural
gas. Despite the gravity of the situation, the law is silent on
whether or not mineral leases are limited by the 99-year
prohibition.
However, courts have begun to adopt the writings of legal
scholars who assert that these mineral leases, under certain
circumstances, may not be leases at all, but, in fact, create an
ownership interest in favor of the leaseholder in the form of a
mineral servitude. Thus, to apply Louisiana Civil Code Article
2679’s conventional 99-year lease limit to a mineral lease
would be to completely disregard the structure of the code and
the inherit distinction between real rights and personal rights.
The scholarly commentary clearly indicates that a mineral
lease is a real right, and it exhibits the major characteristics of
such: the mineral lease may follow the land, regardless of
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transfers of ownership; the mineral lessee may assert his rights
against the world just as the proprietor of any real right; the
lessee may enjoy directly and draw from the land a part of its
economic advantages by appropriating a wasting asset; the
lessee has certain rights of preference; and the lessee holds a
right that is, in reality, susceptible of a type of possession
through exercise.78
The first major adoption of this concept was Eagle Pipe and
Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp., a towering 40-page
recitation of civil law tradition written by the Louisiana
Supreme Court which contains 24 citations to treatises, one
law review citation, and 22 citations to the Comments of the
Law Institute.79
LAW TEACHERS STILL SERVE AS LAW MAKERS
“[Legal scholars] share a language of discourse with
important decision makers in the real world, such as judges and
legislators. Standard legal scholarship often self-consciously
seeks to prescribe real world solutions to real problems.”80
Contrary to the words of Judge Posner, law professors have
an exciting and influential role to play in the development of
jurisprudence. Technological advances in the 21st century
move far too quickly to await the opinions of an appellate
court. In the short term, the work of scholars in trade journals,
law reviews, treatises, symposia, and in the media has a direct
impact on the business world and helps shape the future of
commerce. Over the long arc of time, some bodies of legal
scholarship gain the force of law, as happened in the cases
above, but every legal scholar has an opportunity to publish
work that will inform, educate, and persuade the legislatures
and jurist across the nation.
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